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Abstract
Background: The strategy of health policy has been changed for improving the performances to meeting the
increasing healthcare demands. However, limited evidences were found to prove that the bundled payment was
valid for service delivering in public sector. This study was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a bundled
policy on strengthening the county-village communication and improving the quality of chronic disease
management.
Methods: This is a retrospective cohort study using the data collected in 2011, 2012 and 2014 from the Rural
Health Development Project in China. The policy intervention included performance-related contract with health
facilities, developing technical guideline for doctors and nurses, routine monitoring of performance, and efforts to
increase public awareness about the services. There were two intervention counties in Henan Province, China, while
one county with similar characteristics in Henan was selected as control. Funding allocation, work load and salary for
health care workers, volume of township-to-village technical assistance were reported before and after the policy was
implemented. Our study also examined the policy impacts on improving treatment outcomes of diabetes and
hypertension care.
Results: There were substantial increases in the provision of the basic package of services including 96.6 % of patients
with hypertension, 91.2 % of patients with diabetes under the health management system. After the intervention, there
were 34.3 % (hypertension) and 42.0 % (diabetes) increase in regular follow-up visit rates, 24.6 and 17.2 % increase in
blood pressure and blood glucose control rates, respectively. The family health records system covered 96 % of the
rural families. Technical assistance between township health centres and village clinics were enhanced. Compared
with baseline, the monthly training meeting and field supervision & guidance between township health centres and
village clinics increased 1.0 meeting, 1.5 field visits, respectively, while the increases in the control county were only 0.3
meeting and 0.3 field visits. At the end of this study, 93.8 % of health workers achieved their performance goals. More
patients were referred to appropriate levels of care.
Conclusion: This bundled policy intervention effectively improved rural health care delivery. The result of our study can
be used for local governments to implement performance-based health system management in developing country.
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Background
During the past two to three decades there has been a dra-
matic spread of health reform in many low and middle-
income countries. In some cases this has been associated
with a change in economic model and rapid economic
growth; in other cases it has been associated with pro-
longed economic crisis, deterioration in the performance of
the public sector and the increasing importance of informal
markets. This phenomenon has stimulated interest in govern-
ment strategies for influencing thesemarkets to improve their
performance in meeting health needs [1, 2]. One approach
that has gained a lot of attention is the use of contracts linking
payment of health service providers to their achievement of
health care delivery targets [3–5]. However, very little evidence
is available on in what circumstances delivery of services
through contracts with the private sector is likely to be prefer-
able to direct provision by the public sector [6, 7]. Despite en-
thusiasm about the potential for aligning financial incentives
with high-quality health care, many fundamental questions
about their optimal design, effectiveness, and mechanism of
action remain unanswered [8]. Overall, the international rec-
ord for pay for performance is growing and yet mixed in both
OECD countries and transition economies [9].
This paper presents an intervention in Henan Province in
China aimed at increasing access to theBasic PublicHealth Ser-
vices (BPHS, similar to primary health care in US) [10, 11]
through a combination of performance-related contracts with
health facilities, routine monitoring of performance and efforts
to increase public awareness about the services to which they
are entitled. The payment mode which learns from the British
experience for the pay-for-performance system: health workers
earn points for each performance measure and payment is
tied to the number of points received [12, 13]. Based on
those experiences, the payment mode is built with adjust-
ment to local policy environment. The facilities’ payment
was defined by quarterly assessment and number of goals
achieved listed in the contract. Individuals’ payment was
defined by quantity and quality of works completed.
BPHS package includes the creation of health records for
rural families, health education, and health care for children
under three years old, maternal health care, health care for the
elderly, immunization, reporting of infectious disease, manage-
ment of hypertension and diabetes and treatment of severe
mental illness. While the funding policy for this basic package
of services are in place, the government faces a major challenge
in ensuring that the additional funds reach local health facilities
and are used to provide good quality health services [14].
The new BPHS policy required (and directly funded) cli-
nicians to undertake population screening, especially for
hypertension and diabetes, but also general health screen-
ing for the elderly, and covered both village level costs of
screening and follow up, as well as confirmation on diagno-
sis and higher level care as needed at township hospitals.
Patients pay in full for their drugs and other diagnostic tests
and treatments, but this is largely reimbursed from the
New Cooperative Rural Medical Scheme (NCRMS), the in-
surance system covering almost all rural citizens [15].
The aim of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of
the bundled policy including performance-related contract
with health facilities, developing technical guideline for doc-
tors and nurses, and routine monitoring of performance on
strengthening the county-village communication and im-
proving the quality of chronic disease management.
Methods
Design of the intervention
The Chinese Government established the China Rural
Health Development Project (CRHDP, 2009–2014) [16],
co-funded by the Government of China, a World Bank
credit and a grant from the UK Department For Inter-
national Development(DFID) to test BPHS practical
strategies for implementing its rural health reform.
Henan is one of eight participating provinces.
This study is a retrospective cohort study for evaluating
the effect of BPHS intervention in Henan Province from
2011 to 2014. Each intervention county developed detailed
management guidelines for each item in the package ac-
cording to the National BPHS Guideline Book. These
guidelines defined the roles of the township health centres
and village clinics. The counties estimated the cost of de-
livering these services at township and village levels. They
signed contracts with township health centres to deliver
the package of services on the basis of these cost estimates
and the township health centres signed sub-contracts with
village doctors. These contracts defined the services to be
provided, quality standards to be achieved, and methods
of performance assessment and criteria for payment.
Comparing to the previous payment system in which doc-
tors and nurses received fixed salary regardless of their
performance, this payment mode linked the amount of
payment to the quantity and quality of individuals’ work.
The funds were split more or less evenly between town-
ship and village levels. This was a major departure from
the previous practice of allocating almost all government
funding to government-owned township facilities.
Each county established a team to make quarterly moni-
toring visits to each township to assess their adherence to
the management guidelines. Their monitoring reports
were used to assess the performance of township and vil-
lage levels and determine the performance related element
of their pay. Each county government widely publicised
the services to be provided and established a third-party
(independent and objective) supervision group, including
representatives of local political bodies, villagers, health
managers and health programme technical staff, to ensure
that the contracts were executed smoothly and fairly and
that the reforms to basic public health and primary health
care services were implemented appropriately.
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The design of the intervention was based on the following
specifications: (i) the government allocation would reach
township and village facilities and the increase in funding
for the provision of basic services would increase the incen-
tives to provide public health and primary health care ser-
vices; (ii) the publication of management guidelines and the
linking of pay to the implementation of these guidelines
would influence the performance of health service pro-
viders; (iii) county level facilities would take their monitor-
ing role seriously and record any shortfalls, because they
held the responsibilities for providing the technical assist-
ance, training and designing technical standards in the
health system; (iv) the publicity given to the new policy
would encourage members of the community to put pres-
sure on providers to deliver the services to which they are
entitled and (v) the political supervision group would pro-
vide political support for the implementation of this policy.
Sample selection
In July 2011 two counties (county 1 and county 2) were se-
lected as intervention sites. They were similar in population,
economic development, and in early progress with BPHS
implementation (see Table 1). We also chose a county with
similar characteristics as control. In the control county, the
extra per capita was added to the usual block funding dis-
tributed to county, township and village health services, dis-
tributed in proportion to their total budgets. The control
county was subject to the same goals, and received similar
guidelines and targets as the intervention counties, but no
direct support in the form of training was given; no account-
ability process was implemented, and thus no performance-
based incentive/penalties; nor were the internal management
structures altered to create collaboration between levels of
care, autonomous decision making and decentralized man-
agement of the delivery of the service.
Three townships were randomly selected from each of
the three selected counties, which were stratified by net an-
nual per capita income. Similar method was applied in the
village selection procedure. The lists of villages were ranked
by net annual per capita income, and one village were se-
lected from each of the upper, middle and lower income
group from each of the three townships. In total, nine vil-
lages in three townships in each county were selected.
We evaluated comparability of intervention and con-
trol villages, and compared registration and screening,
referral and disease control and follow up by triangulat-
ing three data sources:
Population data for each village was obtained from
population registers which are kept and updated by the
local police station, and represent the authoritative list-
ings of the population officially resident in that locality.
These are frequently updated. In ten villages across all
counties the accuracy of the population tallies was
checked for those screened and registered for the BPHS
in comparison with the official name lists of the resi-
dents, as registered at the local police station.
Patient lists were obtained from the local record system of
the BPHS, which is held in each township hospital. The
intervention counties have established a BPHS information
management system covering counties, townships and vil-
lages based upon the electronic medical records established
for each registered patient. All township hospitals and all but
a few village clinics have fully functioning electronic medical
records. The patients’ clinical file records and follow-up visits
records were abstracted into a structured record by a spe-
cially trained research team visiting on site at clinics and
hospitals, using name lists and identification numbers. Elec-
tronic data was transferred to USB key, viewed, and com-
bined into a database. For paper records, data was input into
an Excel spreadsheet, and entered into the database on the
same day. For each of the selected villages, one list was pre-
pared of all patients who, at recruitment to the BPHS, had
been screened in the village as suspicious for diabetes on the
basis of a random overnight fasting blood glucose test, and
confirmed at the township hospital using clinical standards
(overnight fasting glucose of ≥7.0 mmol/l). Another list was
prepared of patients with a diagnosis of hypertension, who
had been screened in the village on the basis of a single
seated blood pressure measurement, and confirmed at the
township hospital (using clinical criteria of systolic BP ≥
140 mmHg and/or diastolic BP ≥ 90 mmHg).
Data collection
Pre-/post-intervention data was collected for both interven-
tion and control groups at the beginning (2011), the end of
second year (2012) and the end of 2014. Baseline period
was defined as January 1st, 2011 to June 30th, 2011. The
BPHS intervention was initiated from July 1st, 2011, and
ended as schedule at December 31st, 2014. January 1st,
2014 –December 31st, 2014 was defined as follow-up
period in our analysis. In this study, the facility-level and
Table 1 Demographic characteristics at baseline
County Population
(10,000 people)
% of Age ≥65 years GDP per capita
(10,000 RMB)
Distance from City(Km) No. of Township Centres No. of Village Clinics
1 72.3 9.0 2.7 40 16 381
2 65.4 8.6 3.4 32 15 326
Control 60.4 8.9 2.9 55 15 343
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patient-level data in 2014 were collected for evaluating the
completeness of this project and health outcome achieved.
In this paper we evaluated effects of this intervention
from five aspects, i) distribution of funds; ii) workload of
health services providers; iii) payment to health workers;
iv) number of patient referrals between different levels
of health institutes; v) outputs of chronical disease
management.
Statistical analysis
Input data by using Epi Data (Version 3.1, software
developed by “The Epi Data Association” Odense,
Denmark), Univariate and bivariate analyses were con-
ducted using PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS.Inc) run on Win-
dows 7. Characteristics of intervention counties and
control county at baseline were described by numbers
and percentages. Comparative analysis was calculated
between baseline and follow-up, and further compared
between intervention and control groups. Estimates were
presented with 95 % confidence level.
Qualitative evaluation
Our evaluation team carried out in-depth interviews with
more than 40 administrative staff and public health service
providers in each county. We also reviewed routine man-
agement data from totally eight township health centres
and 24 village clinics. Data including funds allocation,
number of referral patients, number of registered chroni-
cal patients included in the primary health service package
were collected at the beginning (2011), the end of second
year (2012) and the end of 2014. Evaluations were focused
on whether the logistics of the intervention are conducted
accordingly. We examined the degree to which the inter-
vention altered the understandings and behaviour of dif-
ferent stakeholders, including doctors, nurses, patients
and health managers.
Results
Demographic characteristics at baseline
The intervention counties and the control county were
similar in population and economic conditions. Demo-
graphic characteristics at baseline year are shown in Table 1.
Allocation of funds
The county governments spent almost all the budgeted
funds. The townships health centres received a high pro-
portion of the contracted funds and paid a high propor-
tion of sub-contracted funds to village clinics by the end
of year 2014 (Table 2). These data suggest that the funds
were allocated and spent as intended.
Understandings of roles and provision of services
Prior to the intervention, the roles of township and village
facilities were not clearly differentiated and they frequently
competed for patients. After three years of implementation,
the evaluation team found that the frequency of technical
assistance between township health centres and village
clinics had increased significantly (Table 3), Compared to
the baseline period, average monthly training meeting
and field supervision & guidance visits between town-
ship health centres and village clinics increased 1.0
meeting, 1.5 visits respectively, while the increases in
control county were only 0.3 meeting and 0.3 visits, re-
spectively. The township health facilities had increased
the number of staff working on public health and pri-
mary health care services. They had required their
more experienced clinical staff to spend one or two
days a week in this work. The in-depth interviews
found that most staff of township health centres be-
lieved that their workload had increased and their in-
come increased at least more than 30 percent.
The allocation of the performance-related payment
was decided based on how well the service targets
achieved in each health facilities. One indicator for a
facility of good service quality was whether it received
over 90 percent of their optimal performance-related
pay. The proportion of township health centres achiev-
ing this indicator was 94.4 and 91.7 %, respectively in
county 1 and 2. The proportion of villages reaching
this indicator was 95.3 and 93.9 percent, respectively
(Table 4). Health workers received 93.8 % of their
optimal performance-related payment at the end of
study in general. Some reasons for not achieving
these targets were the heavy workload associated
with the creation of new patient files for a large
number of people and the problems that health
workers experienced in learning their roles and
Table 2 Proportions of allowed amount from contracted
government annual budget in the facilities with intervention
(follow-up period, 2014)
County Proportion of Allowed Amount
Paid to Township Health Centres
(%)
Proportion of Contracted




Table 3 Frequency of technical assistance between township
health centres and village clinics
County Average Monthly Training
Meeting (No.)
Average Monthly Field






1 1.2 2.2 1.0 1.1 2.6 1.5
2 1.1 2.0 0.9 1.0 2.4 1.4
Control 1.0 1.3 0.3 0.9 1.2 0.3
*Baseline definition: July- Dec 2011
*Follow-up definition: Jan- Dec 2014
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responsibilities for new programmes such as dia-
betes, hypertension and serious mental illness. This
lack of knowledge meant that they made errors in
patient management.
There were dramatic and continuous increases in the
number of patients referred from village to township
and from township to county levels for pregnancies
(n = 8,997), patients with hypertension (n = 6,802) and
patients with diabetes (n = 846) (Figs. 1 and 2). The
details are presented in Figs. 1 and 2. Based on the
evidence that the population of townships remained
constant across study period, we provide the size of
referrals in absolute value.
Management for quality
The county monitoring teams visited township hospitals
every three months, according to a contract the members
signed with the county health bureau. The township hospi-
tals organised supervision and guidance visits to villages at
least once a month. The purpose of the visits was to iden-
tify problems and suggest actions. Hypertension manage-
ment and diabetes management were selected as evaluation
measures. The management follow up and control rate of
patients with hypertension and diabetes after the
intervention were statistically different between interven-
tion counties and the control county. In intervention
counties, there were 42.0 and 34.3 % increase of
regular follow-up visit rate for diabetes and hyper-
tension, respectively. Additionally, the system of
health records which was established at the same
time, successfully covered 96 % of the rural families.
(Tables 5 and 6).
Discussion
Although many countries may need to allocate more re-
sources to health services, global experience suggests
that merely increasing existing block grants to service
providers is unlikely to achieve the desired effects on
service delivery, equity or effectiveness; changes to the
mode of funding and of organization may both be
needed to reach these goals [17–19]. The evaluation
study found evidence that the counties had implemented
the intervention as planned. They earmarked the agreed
20–35 RMB per capita for the basic package of services,
signed service contracts and paid a high proportion of
the budgeted amounts to township and village facilities.
There were many intended effects. For example, the
township health centres required senior clinicians to al-
locate time to public health and primary health care ser-
vices and village doctors allocated a lot of time to these
services. This study found substantial increases in regu-
lar follow-up visit rates for hypertension and diabetes.
Intervention counties had created appropriate monitor-
ing teams, although there was insufficient evidence on
the contents of their monitoring visits and the degree to
which they influenced performance.
Fig. 1 Number of patient referrals from village clinics to township health centres
Table 4 Proportion of health workers achieving performance
goal at township level and village level






1 88.2 94.4 6.2 90.5 95.3 4.8
2 84.1 91.7 7.6 82.8 93.9 11.1
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This intervention demonstrates the usefulness of a
performance-oriented approach that takes into account
many influences on the performance of health service
providers. This intervention focused on the provision of
management guidelines, on new forms of payment on
the basis of workload and achievement of service deliv-
ery targets and on informing the population about their
new entitlements. Many pilot interventions succeed be-
cause of enthusiasm about something new and the at-
traction of financial rewards, but the initial gains are not
always sustained as stakeholders adapt to the new pat-
tern of incentives [9, 20]. Our study has the implications
as follows: in order to achieve a sustainable change, it is
important to: (i) ensure that health service providers
benefit by delivering good quality services, (ii) establish
effective monitoring arrangements to ensure that good
performers are identified and (iii) create new public ex-
pectations about the services to which they are entitled.
One factor that suggests that this can be achieved is the
similarity between this intervention bears and successful
to reduce maternal mortality [21]. Government officials
made highly public statements in support of institutional
delivery and contributed to a change in expectations
about delivery. The county maternal and child health
centres made regular monitoring visits to township hos-
pitals to assess their performance in organising ante-
natal care, institutional deliveries and post-natal care
and their findings were taken into account in the overall
performance assessment of the health centre directors.
The obstetrics departments of the township hospitals ex-
perienced large increases in patient volume. It was diffi-
cult to interpret the rise in referrals of pregnancies from
village to township levels because in 2011, it was already
government policy for all deliveries to take place in an
institution at township level or higher [22, 23]. The re-
ported increase in referrals may simply be an artefact of
the more formal management system. The referral from
township to county levels may reflect a greater willing-
ness to send patients to higher level facilities. The very
large increase in the number of patients referred for
treatment of hypertension and diabetes suggests that the
township hospitals may experience a similar increase as
Fig. 2 Number of patient referrals from township health centres to county hospitals
Table 5 Comparison of chronic disease management among patients with hypertension between intervention counties and control
county in 2014 (follow-up period)
Indicators County 1 (N = 176) County 2 (N = 180) Control County
(N = 181)
n % p-value* n % p-value* n %
Registration of hypertension patients 170 96.6 p < 0.001 155 86.1 p < 0.001 158 87.3
Regular follow-up visit rate of hypertension patients (%, n) 114 64.8 p < 0.001 124 68.9 p < 0.001 59 32.6
BP control rate of population under management (%) 62 35.2 p < 0.001 49 27.2 p < 0.001 12 6.6
Rate of referral and upper-level doctor’s service accepted by hypertension patients (%) 64 36.4 p < 0.001 56 31.1 p < 0.001 30 16.6
*p-value: Intervention county compared with control county by Chi-square test
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a result of the county-wide screening effort [24]. The
present study did not assess the full mix of treatment
that people screened as having hypertension or diabetes
received, or the full cost of treating them (both to them-
selves and to the rural health insurance scheme). Future
evaluations of the impact of this intervention will have
to assess trends in the cost of managing hypertension
and diabetes.
One important factor in the success of the interven-
tion was the capacity and commitment of the county
government to allocate the required level of resources,
monitor performance and enforce the contracts with
health facilities. This illustrates the need for a strong
government to engage effectively with health markets.
Where government does not have this capacity it would
be very difficult to make this kind of intervention work.
It is important to keep this in mind in assessing the de-
gree to which this experience is relevant elsewhere in
China and in other countries.
The evaluation team identified some issues or study
limitations that need attention as the intervention ma-
tures. First, the difficulty that many health workers had
in newly introduced programmes to manage hyperten-
sion, diabetes and mental illness so training on these
programmes should be organised in the future. Second,
because major effort that had been made to create com-
puterised patient records, more work will be needed to
determine how these records should be used in man-
aging patients and a monitoring the performance of the
health system. Also, more attention should be given to
the contents and impact of the monitoring visits.
Conclusion
This combination intervention of performance-related
contracts with health facilities, routine monitoring of
performance and efforts to increase public awareness
about the services demonstrates its effectiveness on im-
proving the performance of health service providers. It is
important for achieving a sustainable change in the
piloted counties into a more efficient health system,
which successfully engages a strong government role
with health reform.
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